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COMMENTS 
PATENTS - THE CHANGING STANDARD OF PATENTABLE INVEN-
TION: CONFUSION COMPOUNDED-No problem in the law of pat-
ents has caused more confusion than the standard of patentable 
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invention. Lawyers and judges have struggled with this elusive 
concept for more than one hundred years. While it is frequently 
spoken of as a standard of invention, this is a misconception which 
unduly magnifies the problem. "The inventive concept is an 
abstraction impossible to define .... "1 Invention and patent-
ability are not necessarily the same. The real question is not 
what is invention, but what is patentable. How great an advance 
over the prior art is required to warrant patent protection? It is 
a standard of patentability and not a standard of invention we 
are seeking. 
In section I 03 of the 1952 Patent Act, entitled "Conditions for 
patentability; non-obvious subject matter," Congress attempted 
to deal with the problem for the first time.2 Although the avowed 
purpose of the section was to stabilize the law,3 the attempt to 
"codify" the language used in some court decisions has led to much 
speculation as to the emphasis to be placed upon it. Thus the 
statute has added more uncertainty to the already vague and in-
definite standard of patentability. While the liberalizing influence 
of the section has been stressed in legal literature,4 the courts have, 
until recently, uniformly refused to recogniz~ any change in the 
law.5 In Lyon v. Bausch and Lomb Optical Co.,6 Judge Learned 
Hand carefully analyzed the problem and took the position that 
Congress intended to modify the standard then applied by the Su-
preme Court and revive that used twenty-five years ago. He stated 
that under recent Supreme Court decisions he would be compelled 
to find the patent invalid, but upheld it on the basis of his interpre-
tation of the new statute. This comment is directed not only to 
Judge Hand's interpretation, but also to the effect that his deci-
sion has ha<;l, and may be expected to have in the future, both on 
the courts and Congress. 
I. Patentability Prior to 1952 
In order to view the 1952 Patent Act and the resulting interpre-
tations in their proper perspective, it is necessary to consider the 
origin and evolution of the standard of patentability. In 1790 
1 Trabon Engineering Corp. v. Dirkes, (6th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 24 at 27. 
2 35 u.s.c. (1952) §103. 
3 S. Rep. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 18 (1952) 
4 See Lutz, "The New Patent Statute: Congress Revitalizes the Patent System," 39 
A.B.A.J. 209 (1953); Goodman, "The Effect of Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 
Upon the Patent Laws," 35 J.P.O.S. 233 (1953). 
5 See section III infra. 
6 Lyon v. Bausch &: Lomb Optical Co., (2d 'Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 530, cert. den. 350 
U.S. 911 (1955), reh. den. 350 U.S. (1956). 
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Congress enacted the first patent statute, authorizing the issuance 
of patents for new and useful inventions.7 This remained the only 
statutory provision on the degree of novelty required for patenta-
bility until the 1952 act. Not until 1850 did the Supreme Court 
become cognizant of the word "invention" in the statute. In H otch-
kiss v. Greenwood8 the Court enunciated for the first time the 
principle which was to become a stumbling block for judges, law-
yers, and inventors. Justice Nelson, speaking for the majority, held 
a patent invalid since the advance embodied therein did not neces-
sitate " ... more ingenuity and skill ... than were possessed by an 
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business .... "9 This phrase 
became the basis of the requirement that an invention to be patent-
able must be more than merely new and useful. 
One basic difficulty is inherent in this standard. Being sub-
jective in nature it does not lend itself to easy or uniform applica-
tion. The degree of skill attributable to an ordinary mechanic 
will vary according to the knowledge and experience of the 
person applying the test. For this reason several negative tests 
have been developed by which the absence of patentable invention 
may be determined. For example, a concept old in an analogous 
art is not patentable,1° nor is an aggregation11 or a mere rearrange-
ment of parts.12 The omission of an element with its correspond-
ing function is not patentable invention.13 While this is not a 
complete list of the tests applied, it is sufficient to illustrate 
how the patent office and the courts are striving for some definite 
standards to apply. Yet none of these tests are absolute.14 The 
basic subjectivity remains. 
In recent years there has been a growing conviction that 
the Supreme Court has raised the standard of patentability.15 
Judge Hand has referred to a "new doctrinal trend" which he 
7 1 Stat. 109 (1790). For a brief history of prior patent legislation, see Federico, 
"Commentary on the New Patent Act," 35 U.S.C.A. 1 (1954). 
811 How. (52 U.S.) 248 (1850). 
9 Id. at 267. 
10 Paramount Publix Corp. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 464 (1935). 
11 Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347 (1875). 
12Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1882). 
13 In re Porter, (C.C.P .A. 1934) 68 F. (2d) 971. 
14 See e.g. Grever v. United States Hoffman Co., (6th Cir. 1913) 202 F. 923, where a 
reversal of parts was held patentable due to the new and useful results. 
15 See Cooper, "Patent Law: Challenging the Court's View of Invention," 35 A.B.A.J. 
306 (1949); Dodds & Crotty, "The New Doctrinal Trend,'' 30 J.P.O.S. 83 (1948); Lutz, 
"The Constitution v. The Supreme Court Re: Patents For Inventions,'' 13 UNIV. Prrr. L. 
REv. 449 (1952); Contra, Davis, "The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Cases on the 
Question of Patentable Invention," 44 Iu.. L. REv. 41 (1949). 
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was bound to follow.16 A substantial number of courts of appeals 
have concurred.17 Some support is lent this view by the high 
mortality rate of patents which come before the courts. A recent 
Patent Office survey of published decisions indicates that be-
tween 1925 and 1929 37.7 percent of patents before the courts 
of appeals were held valid and infringed, while only 33.4 percent 
were held invalid. In contrast only 18.2 percent were held valid 
and infringed between 1950 and 1954, while 60. 7 percent were 
held invalid.18 Too much reliance should not be placed on these 
statistics to show a change in the standard of patentability. 
Several other explanations may demonstrate why patents fare 
less well today than twenty-five years ago. It has been suggested 
that the lower courts are misinterpreting Supreme Court de-
cisions.19 Some feel that the skill of a mechanic has increased 
in this technological age. 20 A third suggestion is that the Supreme 
Court, distrusting patents and the policy behind them, is apply-
ing the classic tests, but with greater severity.21 These divergent 
views illustrate the dual nature of the problem. One is the 
determination of the standard of patentability in law. The 
second is the application of the standard to the facts of a particular 
case. Although they are not entirely independent, a clear under-
standing of the existence of both is helpful in determining the 
proper context for the 1952 Patent Act. 
16 Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 632 at 636. 
17 Alemite Co. v. Jiffy Lubricator Co., (8th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 444, cert. den. 
339 U.S. 912 (1950), reh. den. 339 U.S. 939 (1950); Trabon Engineering Co. v. Dirkes, 
(6th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 24; Jeoffroy Mfg. v. Graham, (5th Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 
772 (1953), cert. den. 347 U.S. 920 (1954), reh. den. 347 U.S. 940 (1954); Associated 
Folding Box Co. v. Levkoff, (1st Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 252; Contra, Barie v. Superior 
Tanning Co., (7th Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 724; In re Shortell, (C.C.P.A. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 
292. For review of authorities see Balluff, "Do Recent Supreme Court Opinions Raise 
the Standard of Invention, and are Lower Courts Misinterpreting Such Opinions?" 34 
J.P.O.S. 847 (1952). 
18 S. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of 
the Committee on the Judiciary on the American Patent System, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 
p. 182 (1955). Since the Supreme Court hears few patent cases this writer believes that 
those statistics are inconclusive for comparative purposes. But see Frost, "The Patent 
System and the Modern Economy," Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks 
and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 
p. 59 (1956), where the statistics of cases heard by the Supreme Court were used to show 
that it is at least arguable that the decisions today are no less favorable than those 
rendered earlier. 
19 Balluff, "Do Recent Supreme Court Opinions Raise the Standard of Invention 
and Are Lower Courts Misinterpreting Such Opinions?" 34 J.P.O.S. 847 (1952). 
20 Brown &: Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Kar Engineering Co., (1st Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 48 
at 52, cert. den. 328 U.S. 869 (1946). 
21 Davis, "The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Cases on the Question of Patent-
able Invention," 44 ILL. L. REv. 41 (1949). See also Justice Jackson's dissent in Jungersen 
v. Ostby &: Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 at 571 (1949). 
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The Supreme Court has never expressly raised the standard of 
patentability. Nor do its opinions indicate an intention to raise 
the standard as such. In Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,22 
the case most frequently cited as adopting a new and higher 
standard, the court relied on the older authorities, referring 
specifically to the "mechanical skill" test of Hotchkiss v. Green-
wood.23 To be sure the court did use the now famous term, "flash 
of creative genius." However, that idea appeared in the cases as 
early as 1880 and there is no indication that the Court in the 
Cuno case thought it was introducing a new concept.24 The 
phrase has not appeared in subsequent Supreme Court opinions 
and the lower courts have refused to give it a literal interpreta-
tion.25 The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket 
Equipment Corp.26 decision is also cited frequently for the propo-
sition that the standard of patentability has been raised. Yet it 
should be emphasized that it is the concurring opinion of Justice 
Douglas which has caused the most concern. The opinion of the 
Court, written by Justice Jackson, who previously had decried 
the indiscriminate invalidation of patents,27 does not evince an 
intention to raise the standard. 
On the other hand, there are indications that, while no formal 
change has been made in the standard applied by the Supreme 
Court, it is being applied with greater severity. In the past ten 
years the Supreme Court has held valid and infringed only two 
of the fifteen patents which came before it.28 The fact that the 
Supreme Court grants certiorari in so few cases refutes the theory 
that the lower courts are applying a higher standard than would 
the Court. Additional support for this view is evidenced by the 
fact that not since 1935 has the Supreme Court reversed a finding 
of invalidity.29 
22 314 U.S. 84 (1941). 
23 11 How. (52 U.S.) 248 (1950). 
24 See Densmore v. Scofield, 102 U.S. 375 at 378 (1880), where the court used term 
"flash of thought." 
25 Brown &: Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Kar Engineering Co., (1st Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 48, 
cert. den. 328 U.S. 869 (1946). 
26 340 U.S. 147 (1950), reh. den. 340 U.S. 918 (1951). 
27 Jungersen v. Ostby &: Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 (1949), reh. den. 336 U.S. 915 (1949), 
reh. den. 336 U.S. 931 (1949), Justice Jackson dissenting at 571. 
28 Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338 U.S. 267 (1949), reh. den. 338 U.S. 896 (1949); Graver Mfg. 
Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271 (1949), affd. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). In the latter only some 
of the disputed claims were held valid. See S. Hearing before Subcommittee on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary on the American Patent 
System, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 183 (1955). 
29 The last reversal which this writer has been able to find after a diligent search is 
Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. I (1935), reh. den. 294 U.S. 732 (1935). 
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The language in patent opinions, while not changing the 
technical standard, does indicate an attitude opposed to basic 
tenets of the patent system.80 This attitude is based on two 
principal factors. First, some feel that a patent, being in the 
nature of a monopoly, is fundamentally opposed to the spirit of 
the antitrust laws and our free enterprise system.81 This group 
believes that the public benefits every time a patent is held in-
valid. Such a belief, however, results from a misconception of 
the operation of the patent system.82 The second factor is a fear 
that patent rights are frequently abused and is a result of failure 
to distinguish the proper scope of the patent from such abuses. 
The extent of this fear and confusion is illustrated by Russell v. 
Comfort,33 where relief for infringement was denied although the 
facts show no relationship between the abuse and the patent. It 
was this judicial attitude which confronted Congress when it 
included section 103 in the I 952 Patent Act. 
II. The 1952 Patent Act 
The express purpose of the 1952 Patent Act was "to revise 
and codify the laws relating to patents. . . . "34 The· use of those 
two words raises the question as to what parts are revisions and 
what parts are codification. In section I 02 Congress restated the 
law of novelty. Section 103, however, is new to our statutory law 
and reads as follows: 35 · 
"A patent may not be obtained though the invention 
30 See Justice Douglas' dissent in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 at 380 
(1945); Justice Douglas concurring in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket 
Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 at 154 (1950). 
81 See Hamilton and Till, "What is a Patent?" 13 LAw & CONTEM. PROB. 245 (1948); 
Hamilton, "Patents and Free Enterprise," TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 31 (1941). But see 
Oppenheim, "Patents and Antitrust: Peaceful Coexistence?" 54 MICH. L: R.Ev. 199 (1955); 
"Antitrust Problems in the Exploitation of Patents," Staff Report to Subcommittee No. 5 
of the Committee on the Judiciary of tlle House of Representatives, 84tll Cong., 2d sess., 
p. 25 (1957). 
82 But see Frost, "The Patent System and tlle Modem Economy," Study No. 2 of 
the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of tlle Committee on tlle 
Judiciary of tlle Senate, 84tll Cong., 2d sess., p. 60 (1956), where it is urged tliat a 
finding of invalidity results in a disservice to the public in tllat a decision for validity 
induces desirable research. See also Bush, "Proposals for Improving tlle Patent System," 
Study No. 1 of tlle Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of tlle Com-
mittee on tlle Judiciary of the Senate, 84tll Cong., 2d sess., p. 15 (1956). 
83 F. C. Russell Co. v. Comfort Equipment Corp., (7th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 592. 
See REPORT OF THE A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMI'ITEE ·TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST 
LAws 251 (1955). 
34 S. Rep. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 1 (1952); H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 
p. 1 (1952). 
85 35 u.s.c. (1952) §103. 
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is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in sec-
tion I 02 of this title if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such 
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious 
at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which 
the invention was made." 
The second sentence of this section clearly abolishes any remnant 
of the "flash of genius" test, if it ever existed. There is no confusion 
on this point.36 But what did Congress intend to achieve by the 
first sentence of the section? Research in the legislative history of 
the act leads to conflicting conclusions. Speaking of the entire 
act, the House Report refers to "minor procedural and other 
changes deemed substantially noncontroversial and desirable.''37 
While it may be said that a change in the standard of patentable 
invention is desirable, nevertheless it certainly cannot be called 
uncontroversial. In contrast, the same report also speaks of sec-
tion 103 as one of the "major changes or innovations."38 
The terminology of section 103 is that used in Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood,89 which has been a part of the common law of patents 
for more than one hundred years. The congressional reports 
recognize this fact: 
"That provision paraphrases language which has often been 
used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to 
the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section 
should have a stabilizing effect and minimize the great de-
partures which have_ appeared in some cases."40 
Any attempt to analyze this section as either codification or 
revision seems futile. Congress realized it was stating old law 
in statutory form, but did so with a definite purpose in mind, 
viz., to stabilize the law. It is submitted that Congress recognized 
that judicial animosity toward patents had resulted in a more 
strict application of the old standard in many cases. It was hoped 
that a congressional declaration of the standard could prevent 
36 Pacific Contact Laboratories v. Solex Laboratories, (9th Cir. 1953) 209 F. (2d) 
529, cert. den. 348 U.S. 816 (1954); Gagnier Fibre Products Co. v. Fourslides, Inc., (E.D. 
Mich. 1953) 112 F. Supp 926. 
37 H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 3 (1952). 
38 Id. at 5. 
39 Note 8 supra. 
40 S. Rep. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 6 (1952); H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 
p. 7 (1952). 
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the departures arising from this harsh application without any 
change in the basic standard. This interpretation is reinforced 
by the enactment for the first time of two other common law 
concepts which had fallen prey to the stern judicial attitude, 
the presumption of validity and the right of action for contributory 
infringment.41 
III. Judicial Attitude Prior to Bausch & 
Lomb Decision 
Although it is interesting and illuminating to search for 
legislative intent, judicial interpretation is the final determinant 
of the effect of the statute. Prior to the Bausch & Lomb42 de-
cision the courts uniformly referred to section I 03 as a codifica-
tion.43 It is questionable, however, whether much weight should 
be given to these decisions. The two decisions most frequently 
cited for the proposition that section I 03 is merely a codification 
of existing law are Stanley Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co.44 and 
General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co.45 Both cases contain 
such statements, but they are mere dicta, for, although the courts 
did attempt to discover the intent of Congress, the act was ex-
pressly found inapplicable in both instances. In Wasserman v. 
Burgess & Blacher Co.,46 another case which apparently ruled 
section 103 to be a codification, relied solely on the two previous 
decisions and gave no independent consideration to the problem. 
The patent involved in Pacific Contact Laboratories v. Solex 
Laboratories47 was held valid and infringed, making that decision 
authority only for the fact that the standard had not been raised. 
In New Wrinkle v. Watson48 the court found a lack of patentable 
invention under any view of the criteria established by the new 
act. 
Vincent v. Suni-Citrus Products Co.49 is another case where 
the court expressly found the Patent Act inapplicable. Yet al-
though the court believed the act was essentially a codification, 
41 35 u.s.c. (1952) §§281, 271. 
42 Note 6 supra. 
43 Judge Hand recognized this fact but found no case holding that §103 did not 
change the standard of invention. 
44 (3d Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 846, cerL den. 346 U.S. 818 (1953). 
45 (6th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 912, cert. den. 346 U.S. 822 (1953). 
46 (1st Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 402. 
47 (9th Cir. 1953) 209 F. (2d) 529, cert. den. 348 U.S. 816 (1954). 
48 (D.C. Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 421, cert. den. 346 U.S. 820 (1953). 
49 (5th Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 305, cert. den. 348 U.S. 952 (1955). 
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it also recognized the need for uniformity in lower court decisions. 
It further referred to the codification of a "better" view on patent-
ability. This again illustrates the weakness in attemping to solve 
the problem by calling the act a codification or a revision. Some 
circuits have been more favorable toward patents than others. 
The Fifth Circuit, which decided the Suni-Citrus case, is one of 
those which has been favorable to patents.50 The degree of change 
wrought by section 103 must be determined with respect to these 
pre-existing views. For this reason neither Interstate Rubber 
Products Co. v. Radiator Specialty Co.51 nor Application of 
O' Keefe52 can be considered strong authority for the proposition 
that section 103 contemplates no change in patentability. The 
latter case was decided by the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals which has never recognized the "new doctrinal trend."53 
In the Interstate decision the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit speaks of codification of a standard that has been used 
for one hundred years. In view of the favorable attitude of that 
court toward patents it is probably true that no change was in-
tended with respect to their former decisions, which have been 
fairly consistent for that period.54 
Thus it may safely be said that prior to 1955, although all indica-
tions were that the 1952 Patent Act would be interpreted as making 
no change in the standard of patentability to be applied by the 
courts, there was no direct court of appeals decision so holding. 
IV. Effect of Bausch & Lomb Decision 
Judge Learned Hand's decision in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb 
Co.55 was the first judicial recognition that Congress intended to 
restore the classical tests of patentability from which the courts 
had departed to some extent in the preceding twenty-five years. 
While this writer believes it more likely that Congress intended 
only to eliminate the influence of the intangible judicial attitude 
opposed to patents which had caused a harsh application of the 
50 See S. Hearings before Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of 
the Committee on the Judiciary on the American Patent System, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 
p. 178 (1955). For the period from 1948 to 1954, a review of percentage of patents held 
valid and infringed showed the following: 4th Cir., 37%; 5th Cir., 36.7%; 9th Cir., 24.5%; 
10th Cir., 21.9%; 7th Cir., 19.0%; 6th Cir., 15.4%; 1st Cir., 11.5%; 8th Cir., 8.4%; 3d Cir., 
7.5%; 2d Cir., 2.6%. 
51 (4th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 546. 
52 (C.C.P.A. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 767. 
53 In re Shortell, (C.C.P .A. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 292. 
54 See note 50 supra. 
55 Note 6 supra. 
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old standards, this decision nevertheless restores the promise 
originally seen in section 103.56 It remains to be seen whether 
this decision will have any persuasive effect on other courts. 
Although the opinion has received great notoriety, it is too 
early to determine its fate.57 The "somewhat more lenient 
standard" seems to have run into difficulty in the Second Circuit 
where it originated. Three recent cases have held patents invalid 
while ostensibly, though somewhat reluctantly, applying that 
standard.58 In a fourth case, Judge Frank, who wrote the opinion, 
stated that he had serious doubts about the correctness of the 
ruling.59 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had an 
opportunity to reexamine its dicta in General Motors Corp. v. 
Estate Stove Co.,60 but reaffirmed its earlier position without con-
sidering Judge Hand's decision.61 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit 
has ignored the decision in finding nothing novel in section 103.62 
On the other hand, the District of Columbia Circuit, referring 
to Bausch & Lomb, stated that it could " ... safely assume that 
the Patent Act of 1952 was intended to restore 'the law to what it 
was when the court announced the definition of invention.' "63 
The Tenth Circuit, although not referring to the Bausch & Lomb 
decision, indicated a similar feeling when it said, "It may well 
be that the Congress intended to roll back the philosophical 
standards of patentabili:ty typified by Cuno Engineering Corp. 
v. Automatic Devices Corp., ... and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea 
Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Co .... "64 
At present the decision appears to have had its most pronounced 
effect in the Third Circuit. Prior to Judge Hand's decision, 
that court in dicta had considered section I 03 a codification, 
causing no change in the standard of patentability.65 In R. M. 
56 See Oppenheim, "Patents and Antitrust: Peaceful Coexistence?" 54 MICH. L. REv. 
199 at 205 (1955). 
57 See 55 CoL. L. REv. 1231 (1955), 44 Gp,. L.J. 100 (1955), 1956 Wrs. L. REv. 513. 
:;s Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Kennedy Mfg. Co., (2d Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 280; Gentzel v. 
Manning, Maxwell &: Moore, Inc., (2d Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 341, cert. den. 352 U.S. 840 
(1956); Welsh Mfg. Co. v. Sunware Products Co., (2d Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 225. 
59 Vermont Structural Slate Co. v. Tatko Brothers Slate Co., (2d Cir. 1956) 233 F. 
(2d) 9 at 11, n. 3. 
60 Note 45 supra. 
61 Bobertz v. General Motors Corp., (6th Cir. 1955) 228 F. (2d) 94, cert. den. 352 U.S. 
824 (1956). 
62 Helms Products v. Lake Shore Mfg. Co., (7th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 677. 
6SL-O-F Glass Fibers Co. v. Watson, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 228 F. (2d) 40 at 47, n. 14. 
64 Blish, Mize and Silliman Hardware Co. v. Time Saver Tools, Inc., (10th Cir. 1956) 
236 F. (2d) 913 at 915. 
65 Stanley Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., note 44 supra. 
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Palmer Co. v. Luden's, Inc.66 the court has at least modified its 
position, if not reversed it. The court felt th~t in view of the 
statements that the act was a codification, declarations that it 
"changed" the law were "perhaps" too strong. Nevertheless, 
Judge Kalodner, speaking for the majority of the full court, 
felt inclined to accept Judge Hand's observations that there 
was a judicial tendency to expect an indefinite "more" with-
in the old standards. He realized that the extent of the 
change wrought by section 103 depended upon the court's pre-· 
existing view on patentability, but did not indicate how this 
affected that court's prior views.67 He was impressed by the 
congressional desire to stabilize the law and the inclusion of the 
presumption of validity in the statute. It appeared to him 
that the presumption was intended to achieve the stabilizing 
effect. Whether the case should be limited to a strengthen-
ing of the presumption of validity or whether it also in-
dicates some relaxation of the courts' harsh views on patent-
ability is still in doubt.68 
V. The Future 
The only statement that can be made with unquestioned ac-
curacy about the standard of patentable invention is that it pre-
sents one of the most difficult problems in the law. Being sub-
jective in nature it requires some value judgments and presents 
wide opportunities for variance. Prior to 1952 many courts in-
dicated an attitude opposed to the basic philosophy of the patent 
system, which expressed itself in a harsh application of the 
standard of patentable invention. Congress was aware of this 
fact when it enacted the 1952 Patent Act and attempted to alleviate 
the problem and stabilize the law by including section 103 which 
codified language used in some prior cases. Until 1955 it ap-
peared that the hope foreshadowed by the act would be ex-
tinguished by misconceived judicial interpretation. While the 
Bausch & Lomb decision and those which follow it again renew 
this hope, they do not represent an elixir. Taken literally they 
merely refer one to prior judicial statements defining a vague and 
66 (3d Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 496. 
67 See note 50 supra. It would appear that this court previously entertained a very 
harsh attitude toward patents. 
68 In Newburg Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., (3d Cir. 1956) 111 U.S.P.Q. 126, 
it was cited as stating a standard of patentability. It is not clear, however, what standard 
was set. 
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indefinite standard.69 They do not eliminate the uncertainty 
of the standard or prevent judicial determinations based on an 
individual judge's philosophy toward the patent system. 
Congress again has indicated an awareness of the problem. 
In 1955 the O'Mahoney Subcommtttee of the Senate70 began 
a study of the patent laws and their operation. One of the principal 
concerns of that study has been the standard of patentability. 
The committee has expressed concern bver the problem of the 
great divergence between an issued patent and a val~d patent.71 
Two principal types of solutions have been suggested. The first 
would eliminate the inventive concept as a prerequisite to patent-
ability and establish a recording system similar to the copyright 
law.72 The second would replace the subjective test of patenta-
bility with an objective test.73 Neither approach has been generally 
accepted, the former because it misplaces the emphasis of the 
patent system and the latter because it introduces too much 
rigidity into the system.74 Yet, while there is a desire to keep 
flexibility in the standard of patentability, there is also a demand 
in some quarters for "freshly defined criteria of invention."75 
What the ultimate result~ of the O'Mahoney Subcommittee's 
study will be is not certain. Several private research studies for that 
subcommittee are still in preparation.76 It is clear, however, that 
the subcommittee stands behind the basic philosophy of the patent 
system. It is this writer's belief that the basic problem lies not in 
69 St,e Smith, "Recent Developments in Patent Law," 44 MICH. L. REv. 899 (1946), 
for exposition of the view that the "new doctrinal trend" was but a reversion to stricter 
standards of an earlier period. 
70 The Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the Senate. 
71 See S. Rep. 1464, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 4 (1956); S. Rep. 72, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 
p. 8 (1957). 
12 See testimony of Judge Learned Hand, S. Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 
1st sess., p. 114 (1955). 
73 See, e.g., the "new functional relationship" test suggested by G. Wright Arnold, 
S. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 47, 48 (1955). 
74 See Frost, "The Patent System and the Modern Economy," Study of the Subcom-
mittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th 
Cong., 2d sess., pp. 54, 55 (1957). · 
75 See Bush, "Proposals for Improving the Patent System," Study of the Subcom-
mittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
Senate, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 15 (1956). Nevertheless, the author still speaks in terms 
of obviousness. Compare with Frost, "The Patent System and the Modern Economy, 
Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the Senate, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 56 (1957), where the "skill of the 
art" test is termed the only adequate general measure of invention. 
76 See S. Rep. 72, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 22 to 29 (1957). 
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the standard of patentable invention but in this philosophy to-
ward patents and the patent system. If the problem is going to be 
solved, it will not be by a statutory definition of invention, but by 
a thorough understanding of the operation of the patent system and 
a realization by those who apply the laws that the patent laws are 
not inconsistent with the antitrust laws and that there are inde-
pendent realms of protection granted by each. 77 In this respect 
the congressional study may lead to a clarification of the confused 
standard of patentable invention. 
John M. Webb, S.Ed. 
77 See Oppenheim, "Patents and Antitrust-Peaceful Coexistence?" 54 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
199 (1955). 
